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1. Introduction 
The 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections brought 
about a novelty: the major European party families 
nominated top candidates for President of the Europe-
an Commission, the so-called Spitzenkandidaten. Up 
until then, the European Council nominated candidates 
for Commission President. By making the Presidency 
dependent on the outcome of the elections, executive 
power was—indirectly—at stake. We explore funda-
mental questions relating to this novelty: first, what 
explains whether citizens formulate a preference for a 
Spitzenkandidat? Second, which factors are responsible 
for variations in such preferences? And third, are these 
explanations moderated by citizens’ political awareness? 
We situate our study in extant research on EP elec-
tions. This literature traditionally characterises these 
elections as being second-order national elections, 
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which tend to be dominated by domestic politics. 
Compared to national elections, they display more 
signs of sincere voting and provide more opportunity 
to express discontent because no executive power has 
been at stake thus far. As a consequence, turnout is 
generally lower than in national elections, smaller and 
opposition parties tend to gain votes at the expense of 
government and larger parties, and radical, often Euro-
sceptic parties at the left and right ends of the spec-
trum do relatively well (e.g., Hix & Marsh, 2011; Reif & 
Schmitt, 1980; Van der Eijk, Franklin, & Marsh, 1996).1  
In an attempt to change the ‘second-order nature’ 
of EP elections, the novel Spitzenkandidat element was 
introduced in 2014. Moreover, it sought to address 
concerns about the EU’s democratic deficit which, 
among other things, has thus far been reflected in the 
lack of opportunities for citizens to determine the 
composition of the EU executive (Føllesdal & Hix, 
2006). Hobolt and Tilley (2014) argue further that the 
EU suffers from an accountability deficit because citi-
zens are not provided with sufficient information and 
opportunity to hold EU politicians accountable in EP 
elections. The Spitzenkandidaten campaigns had the 
potential to change this lack of information available to 
EU citizens because by nominating top candidates, the 
EP political groups sought to raise the awareness of 
and interest in the elections among European citizens2.  
Most of the embryonic research on the role of 
Spitzenkandidaten has focused on the question wheth-
er and how their campaigns influenced citizens’ inter-
est in the EU elections (e.g., Hobolt, 2014), whether it 
motivated people to participate in those elections 
(Schmitt, Hobolt, & Popa, 2015), and how their partici-
pation in televised debates influenced attitudes to-
wards the EU (Maier, Rittberger, & Faas, 2016). Our 
study contributes to this field by focusing on the rela-
tionship between political information and attitudes 
towards Spitzenkandidaten. Our study differs funda-
mentally from the other studies, in the sense that atti-
tudes towards these Spitzenkandidaten represent the 
explanandum; in particular we explore citizens’ prefer-
ences with regard to the Spitzenkandidaten. 
To do this, we rely on original survey data as part of 
a four-wave online panel study conducted in the Neth-
erlands in the context of the EP elections (De Vreese, 
Azrout, & Möller, 2014). In the third wave of the panel 
survey, which was fielded in April 2014, i.e. one month 
prior to Election Day, we asked respondents to indicate 
their preferences for the three main Spitzenkandi-
                                                          
1 However, research on individual-level voter behaviour also 
suggests that strategic considerations play a role as well (e.g., 
Boomgaarden, Johann, & Kritzinger, 2016; Carrubba & Tim-
pone, 2005; Clark & Rohrschneider, 2009; Giebler & Wagner, 
2015). 
2 See the EP’s resolution of 22 November 2012 (2012/2829 
(RSP)). 
daten, Guy Verhofstadt, Martin Schulz, and Jean-
Claude Juncker.3 Our research is guided by three ques-
tions: first, what explains whether citizens formulate a 
preference for a certain Spitzenkandidat? Second, 
which factors are responsible for variations in such 
preferences? And, third, to what extent are the effects 
of these different factors moderated by political aware-
ness, which Zaller (1992, p. 21) defines as ‘the extent to 
which an individual pays attention to politics and under-
stands what he or she has encountered’ (emphasis in 
the original). Our results show that news exposure as 
well as having general EU political information and cam-
paign-specific information about the Spitzenkandidaten 
are important pre-conditions for citizens to formulate a 
preference for each of the Spitzenkandidaten. Moreo-
ver, knowledgeable citizens are able to use left/right and 
national party preferences as ‘cues’ to form their atti-
tudes towards the specific candidates. These findings 
have important theoretical and political implications 
which we discuss in the conclusion.  
2. Expressing Preferences for Spitzenkandidaten 
Political awareness is likely to represent a crucial pre-
condition enabling citizens to express their preferences 
for the Spitzenkandidaten. Zaller (1992, p. 21) argues 
that news exposure is important, but not sufficient for 
voters to formulate opinions. Citizens also need to 
have factual information at hand in order to make an 
informed choice at the polls. In the following discus-
sion, we thus distinguish between news exposure and 
the extent to which citizens have political information 
about the EU, and the Spitzenkandidaten in particular.  
Existing research has shown that information about 
the EU, its institutions and politicians is widely availa-
ble to citizens. News coverage during EP election cam-
paigns has become more comprehensive in recent 
years (Boomgaarden & De Vreese, 2016; De Vreese, 
Banducci, Semetko, & Boomgaarden, 2006; Schuck, Xe-
zonakis, Elenbaas, Banducci, & De Vreese, 2011) and 
the EP as well as individual members (MEPs) receive 
regular broadsheet coverage during non-election times 
(Gattermann, 2013; Gattermann & Vasilopoulou, 2015). 
Furthermore, research on the personalization of poli-
tics suggests that individual politicians (e.g., Langer, 
2007; Rahat & Sheafer, 2007) and leaders in particular 
(e.g., Boumans, Boomgaarden, & Vliegenthart, 2013) 
receive increasingly more news attention at the ex-
                                                          
3 Former Belgian Prime Minister Verhofstadt was put forward 
by the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) on 
February 1, 2014; the incumbent EP President and German pol-
itician Schulz was chosen by the Progressive Alliance of Social-
ists and Democrats (S&D) as their main contender on March 1, 
2014; and Juncker, former Prime Minister of Luxembourg and 
former President of the Eurogroup, was nominated by the Eu-
ropean People’s Party (EPP) on March 7, 2014 (see also Put, 
Van Hecke, Cunningham, & Wolfs, 2016). 
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 1, Pages 37-54 39 
pense of political parties and institutions. We still know 
little about such trends in EU politics (Gattermann, 
2015), however, we may expect that the personaliza-
tion of the EP election campaign would generate more 
media attention (e.g., see Schulze, 2016), especially 
since the Spitzenkandidaten had ‘substantial presence 
on the ground’ through their direct campaigns across 
Europe (Schmitt et al., 2015, p. 351) and their partici-
pation in several pan-European televised debates. 
Survey research has shown that news exposure can 
have positive effects on the intentions to turn out to 
vote (e.g., Aarts & Semetko, 2003; De Vreese & Boom-
gaarden, 2006; De Vreese & Tobiasen, 2007; Schmitt-
Beck & Mackenrodt, 2010; Schuck, Vliegenthart, & De 
Vreese, 2016). We consider two interrelated ways in 
which news exposure affects turnout. First, media at-
tention would increase citizens’ perceptions that there 
is something important at stake, and secondly, news 
exposure informs people about what is at stake. To the 
extent that this second mechanism applies, we would 
expect that those citizens who are regularly exposed to 
news coverage will be better able to express a prefer-
ence for a certain Spitzenkandidat.  
Some argue that these effects would be conditional 
upon the type of content. Aarts and Semetko (2003), 
for instance, show that exposure to public television 
had a positive effect on an individual’s decision to par-
ticipate in general elections, while private television 
caused negative effects. Similarly, De Vreese and Tobi-
asen (2007) find that newspaper reading and watching 
news on public television programmes increased the 
likelihood of voters to turn out in the 2004 EP elec-
tions. Other research suggests that soft-news and non-
quality outlets may also increase awareness, such as 
knowledge about 2004 US primary campaigns, which 
was positively influenced by exposure to US Democrat-
ic candidates’ appearances in late-night programmes 
and comedy shows (Brewer & Cao, 2006). During the 
2009 EU elections, Banducci, Giebler and Kritzinger 
(2015) even found that exposure to non-quality news 
content had a stronger relationship with knowledge 
about party positions in EU elections than exposure to 
quality news. This is slightly surprising because re-
search has shown that during EP elections European af-
fairs are more visible in quality media compared to 
non-quality outlets (e.g., De Vreese et al., 2006). Con-
versely, non-quality outlets are more likely to present 
news in terms of personalization, that is to say, shifting 
away from issues to individuals, as it goes hand in hand 
with the news value of human interest. Jebril, Albæk 
and De Vreese (2013) indeed found that exposure to 
personalization content has a negative effect on politi-
cal cynicism, albeit only for those who are generally 
less interested in politics. We thus expect that news 
exposure to both quality and non-quality news content 
has a significant, positive effect on the preference for a 
Spitzenkandidat. 
H1a: The higher their news exposure, the more 
likely citizens are to formulate a preference for the 
Spitzenkandidaten.  
However, exposure to information does not necessarily 
infer that citizens are fully aware of that information. 
They also have to process the information that is availa-
ble to them. We apply the definition of political aware-
ness by Zaller (1992, p 21) and consider knowledge as an 
indicator of having factual information. In line with much 
of the extant literature, we distinguish between general 
political information and campaign-specific information 
(e.g., Chaffee, Zhao, & Leshner, 1994; Converse, 1962; 
Nadeau, Nevitte, Gidengil, & Blais, 2008). General politi-
cal information can be understood as information that 
has been available prior to the election campaigns, such 
as general differences between political parties, whereas 
campaign-specific information relates to the candidates 
themselves and their different policy positions (Chaffee 
et al., 1994, p. 306).4  
Political information is also relevant for electoral 
decisions. Nadeau et al. (2008) show that those with 
high levels of general information are less likely to 
change their vote choice over the course of the cam-
paigns, while campaign-specific information increases 
the likelihood of volatility. In the EU context, infor-
mation is also key to opinion formation and vote 
choice. Elenbaas, De Vreese, Boomgaarden and Schuck 
(2012) show that utilitarian performance judgements 
are positively influenced by acquisition of perfor-
mance-specific information, while general political 
knowledge does not play a direct role. Regarding voter 
behaviour in EU elections, De Vries, Van der Brug, Van 
Egmond and Van der Eijk (2011) find that general polit-
ical knowledge positively affects EU issue voting, that 
is, the extent to which vote choice is being influenced 
by attitudes towards EU integration (De Vries, 2007).  
EU politics are quite complex and do not necessarily 
resemble political processes in the domestic political 
system with which citizens are more familiar. This 
complexity is also apparent in the Spitzenkandidaten 
nomination: it was not clear during the campaigns 
whether and how the election outcome would trans-
late into a position in the executive office. General in-
formation about EU politics is thus likely to be impera-
tive for the ability of citizens to formulate preferences 
for the Spitzenkandidaten.  
H1b: The more comprehensive their general 
political information about the EU, the more likely 
are citizens to formulate preferences for the 
Spitzenkandidaten.  
                                                          
4 These two types of information correlate highly; those who 
have high levels of general political information available are 
also more likely to have more campaign-specific information at 
hand (e.g., Converse, 1962, p. 586). 
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Turning to campaign-specific information, Gelman and 
King (1993) as well as Arcenaux (2006) argue that cam-
paigns enable voters, through learning, to form ‘en-
lightened preferences’ for parties or candidates. Evi-
dence suggests that this is also case for EU elections 
and referendums. Although De Vries et al. (2011) do 
not specifically test the effects of campaign-specific in-
formation at the individual level, they find that the 
context of higher media attention towards the EU and 
more party contestation during the elections increases 
the extent of EU issue voting. Furthermore, Hobolt and 
Wittrock (2011) show that voters with additional in-
formation about the EU positions of parties are more 
likely to base their vote choice on their preferences for 
EU integration (see also Hobolt, 2007).  
With particular view to the Spitzenkandidaten nom-
ination, the difficulty for voters lay in linking the candi-
dates with those national parties that indirectly sup-
ported the lead candidate. In European elections, 
voters are unable to vote for a European party group 
directly, but elect representatives of national parties. 
In other words, Dutch voters were required to under-
stand that a vote for the Christian Democrats (CDA) 
means an indirect support for the EPP and therewith 
also their lead candidate Jean-Claude Juncker. We may 
thus also expect that campaign-specific information 
qualifies citizens to formulate a preference for a 
Spitzenkandidat. Conversely, those who only have very 
little or no information are unlikely to be able to for-
mulate a preference since they are unlikely to have 
made the connection between their vote for a national 
party and the Spitzenkandidaten.  
H1c: Citizens are more likely to formulate a 
preference for the Spitzenkandidaten, the more 
campaign-specific information they have about 
them. 
3. Explaining Variations in Preferences for 
Spitzenkandidaten 
Having discussed our hypotheses regarding the first 
main question—what explains whether citizens formu-
late preferences for the Spitzenkandidaten—we now 
turn to the question what explains variations in such 
perceptions. Why would someone have a high prefer-
ence for Schulz and dislike Verhofstadt? To answer this 
question, it is important to realize that at the start of 
the campaign the Spitzenkandidaten were hardly 
known outside their home countries. This raises the 
question, on what basis can citizens form their judg-
ments of candidates for whom they know very little? 
The relevant literature on voting behaviour shows 
that voters who lack ‘encyclopaedic’ information about 
parties or candidates can often make use of ‘cues’, or 
‘information shortcuts’, which help them form their 
political preferences (e.g., Lupia, 1994; Toka, 2008). 
Electoral research since the 1950s has repeatedly 
demonstrated that most voters have limited political 
knowledge (e.g., Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 
1960; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). Yet, even those with 
limited knowledge are often able to make a reasoned 
choice if they use the little information that they have in 
a smart way (e.g., Popkin, 1991; Sniderman, 2000; Van 
der Brug, 1999), though the choices derived from these 
cues may often be suboptimal (e.g., Lau & Redlawsk, 
2001). In the absence of concrete knowledge about the 
issue positions of parties, citizens often rely on more 
general information they have about these parties, such 
as their left-right positions (e.g., Downs, 1957; Van der 
Eijk & Franklin, 1996). Other important heuristics that 
have been identified are partisan information (e.g., Ho-
bolt, 2007), campaign events (Lodge, Steenbergen, & 
Brau, 1995), and perceptions of corruption (Toka, 2008). 
In the context of EP elections it has been well es-
tablished that voters, lacking information about Euro-
pean affairs, often take cues from national politics (An-
derson, 1998). This is so frequent that European 
elections have even been labelled second-order na-
tional elections (e.g., Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Schmitt & 
Thomassen, 1999; Van der Brug & Van der Eijk, 2007). 
There are various cues that voters can take from na-
tional politics, such as their satisfaction with the in-
cumbent parties, scandals, economic developments, 
evaluations of party leaders, preferences for national 
parties, or ideological similarities. In this paper we fo-
cus only on these latter two aspects: national party 
preferences and ideological distance. 
If voters have little information about the Spitzen-
kandidaten, we believe it makes sense for them to rely 
on these two cues. A Dutch person with a strong pref-
erence for the national CDA could use this as a cue to 
evaluate Junker of the EPP. If she dislikes the Dutch So-
cial Democrats (PvdA), she could equally use this as a 
cue to derive a less positive evaluation of the social 
democratic Spitzenkandidat Schulz. Another cue that 
voters can use to evaluate the Spitzenkandidaten 
would be through the lens of ideology. If someone is 
left-leaning and thus perceives himself to be ideologi-
cally close to the PvdA and far from the VVD (liberals), 
he might use this as a heuristic to evaluate Schulz more 
positively than Verhofstadt. We derive the following 
two hypotheses: 
H2a: National party preferences will positively 
affect the preferences of the Spitzenkandidat of the 
affiliated party group. 
H3a: Ideological distances to the affiliated national 
party will have a negative effect on preferences for 
the Spitzenkandidaten. 
However, the extent to which voters are able to use 
these national party preferences as a heuristic from 
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which to derive information about the candidates will 
depend crucially on their pre-existing knowledge. This 
argument is based on Zaller (1992) who asserts by his 
‘reception axiom’ that those who are politically aware 
are better able to evaluate and therefore make use of 
the cues they receive. It has been well established in 
the literature that the extent of issue voting increases 
with the knowledge about party positions (e.g., Alva-
rez, 1997; De Vries et al., 2011; Hobolt, 2009; Steen-
bergen, Edwards, & De Vries, 2007). In the case of this 
particular study, the moderating role of political infor-
mation seems particularly relevant. If one does not 
know that Schulz is the Spitzenkandidat of the social 
democratic party group, ideological orientations as well 
as national party affiliations are not very useful devices 
to evaluate him. General political knowledge might be 
important for using national party orientations as a cue. 
A person with hardly any knowledge of the national par-
ties or their ideological positions will not be able to use 
this information. However, an even more crucial piece of 
information is the party political information of the 
Spitzenkandidaten. Without such campaign specific in-
formation, it would be very difficult to use national party 
affiliations or left-right orientations as cues. From this 
we derive the following hypotheses: 
H2b: The effect of national party affiliations 
(specified under H2a) will increase with the level of 
general political information about the EU.  
H2c: The effect of national party affiliations 
(specified under H2a) will increase with the level of 
campaign specific information.  
H3b: The effect of left-right distances (specified 
under H3a) will increase with the level of general 
political information about the EU.  
H3c: The effect of left-right distances (specified 
under H3a) will increase with the level of campaign 
specific information.  
4. Data and Methods 
4.1. Sample and Data  
Our analysis rests on original survey data collected 
within a four-wave online panel study in the Nether-
lands between December 2013 and June 2014 in the 
context of the EP elections on May 22, 2014. Unlike 
many other online panels, respondents are not self-
selected, but are based on a random sample of the 
Dutch adult population. It is part of the ‘2014 European 
Election Campaign Study’; and the sample is representa-
tive in terms of age, gender, and education compared to 
census data (De Vreese et al., 2014). The survey was 
conducted using Computer Assisted Web Interviewing 
(CAWI), and the fieldwork was carried out by TNS NIPO 
Netherlands, which is a research organisation that 
complies with the ESOMAR guidelines for survey re-
search approved under ISO. We employ survey ques-
tions of waves one and three. The latter contains the 
relevant information for our dependent variables. The 
fieldwork for the third wave was conducted between 
April 17 and 28, 2014; the first wave was fielded be-
tween December 13, 2013 and January 19, 2014. The N 
comprises 2189 in the first wave (response rate: 78.1%), 
and 1537 in the third wave (re-contact rate: 84.5%).  
The Netherlands represents an ideal political con-
text for studying electoral support for the Spitzenkan-
didaten during the 2014 European election campaigns: 
the three prominent Spitzenkandidaten, who are sub-
ject to this study (Jean-Claude Juncker, Martin Schulz, 
and Guy Verhofstadt), come from three neighbouring 
countries, Luxembourg, Germany, and Belgium, respec-
tively. At the start of the campaign the party groups in 
the European Parliament agreed that the Spitzenkandi-
dat of the largest party group would be nominated to 
become President of the Commission. This is how the 
debates of the Spitzenkandidaten were presented to 
the European public, although the heads of state in the 
European Council remained largely silent during the 
campaigns and seemingly left their options open (see 
also Hobolt, 2014). These developments thus represent 
an ideal setting for our study, which seeks to investi-
gate whether citizens formulate a preference for an in-
dividual candidate and what explains their preferences.  
4.2. Dependent Variables and Design Issues 
Our dependent variables are electoral preferences for 
Spitzenkandidaten. These preferences were measured 
by survey questions which are intended to be as closely 
related as possible to electoral preferences without be-
ing contaminated by personality characteristics such as 
charm, friendliness, etc. These kinds of personality 
characteristics could themselves influence electoral 
preferences, but we were looking for a measure that 
taps into such preferences themselves. We operation-
alized the dependent variable by a short battery of 
questions, which were included in the third wave: ‘The 
three European Party Families (the Social Democrats, 
the Christian Democrats, and the Liberal Democrats) 
have each presented a European candidate to be 
elected as President of the European Commission by 
the new Parliament. If you were able to vote for a can-
didate directly, how likely are you to vote for the fol-
lowing politicians? Please specify your views on a 10-
point scale where 1 means “not at all likely” and 10 
means “very likely”’. Respondents were asked to indi-
cate their probability to vote for Jean-Claude Juncker, 
Martin Schulz, and Guy Verhofstadt.5 The order of 
                                                          
5 In addition, the answer options included a control, Jeroen 
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these candidates was randomised. None of the re-
spondents received information about the national or 
European party family affiliation of the candidates. All 
respondents were given a ‘don’t know’ option. Further-
more, the sample of the third wave was split in two sub-
samples to which respondents were randomly assigned: 
under the first condition respondents were given the 
question as presented above (n=789), respondents in 
the second condition (n=748) were additionally provided 
with the country of origin for each candidate (e.g., ‘Jean-
Claude Juncker from Luxembourg’). We merge both sub-
samples, but control for the country cue for each 
Spitzenkandidat with a dummy variable.  
To answer our first research question, we rely on a 
set of binary variables which indicate whether or not 
respondents expressed a vote preference for each 
Spitzenkandidat, which is coded as 1 if they did. The 
majority of respondents opted for ‘don’t know’ (coded 
as 0) on each candidate, although fewer respondents 
chose this option for Verhofstadt (M=0.42, SD=0.49) 
than for Juncker (M=0.39, SD=0.49) and Schulz 
(M=0.39, SD=0.49). To explain variation in these varia-
bles we rely on a logistic regression. We analyse the 
preferences for each candidate separately as most re-
spondents who indicate a preference for one candidate 
also indicate a preference for another candidate. Thus, 
modelling options such as McFadden’s choice model 
are not appropriate, because the alternatives are not 
mutually exclusive.  
To answer our second and third research questions, 
which focus on an explanation of differences in the 
evaluations of the three Spitzenkandidaten, we exclude 
the ‘don’t knows’ on each candidate and created a da-
taset in a ‘stacked’ format. In this dataset, the re-
spondent*candidate is the unit of analysis, so that each 
respondent appears as many times as there are candi-
dates for whom s/he expressed a preference (maximal-
ly three times). We are primarily interested in the with-
in-voter variation in their preferences for the three 
candidates (thus explaining why someone prefers can-
didate A over B), rather than the between-voter varia-
tion (why do some people express higher preferences 
than others to all candidates). We therefore analyse 
these data by means of multi-level analyses with fixed 
effects at the level of individual respondents. Conse-
quently, individual level controls which do not vary 
within individuals are not included in these analyses. As 
robustness checks, we also present random effects 
analyses with individual level controls in the appendix. 
The results are substantively very similar. 
                                                                                           
Dijsselbloem, who was Dutch Finance Minister and President 
of the Eurogroup at the time. Since he was not actually a stand-
ing candidate and he was always kept last in the answer op-
tions in both sub-samples, we exclude him from our analysis. 
4.3. Independent Variables 
Our main independent variables correspond to the hy-
potheses outlined above and are subject to both ex-
planatory analyses. We operationalise news exposure 
(H1a,) by four items surveyed in the third wave. Public 
TV exposure (M=3.31, SD=2.69) and private TV expo-
sure (M=2.19, SD=2.42) each consist of the mean num-
ber of days per week a respondent watches either a 
public or private news programme on television and 
range from 0 to 7. For the newspaper items we aggre-
gated the daily exposure to four broadsheets (NRC 
Handelsblad, NRC Next, Trouw, De Volkskrant) and four 
tabloids (Algemeen Dagblad, De Telegraaf, Metro, 
Spits), to form the variables broadsheet exposure 
(M=0.99, SD=2.56) and tabloid exposure (M=2.67, 
SD=3.96), respectively. 
Political information is measured by two variables, 
which we operationalised in a similar manner as 
Nadeau et al. (2008, p. 235) and Elenbaas et al. (2012, 
p. 737), but with fewer and different items. The first 
variable, general EU information (H1b, H2b, H3b), is 
comprised of three questions from the third wave. 
These enquire about the number of Dutch MEPs after 
the 2014 elections, the current number of EU member 
states, and the current EP President. Each question 
comprised five answer categories to choose from, plus 
a ‘don’t know’ option. We recoded all three variables 
into binary variables which are 1 if the correct answers 
were provided, and 0 if not. We then added them up to 
form a scale, ranging from 0 to 3 (M=0.55, SD=0.84). A 
Mokken scale analysis (e.g., Van Schuur, 2003), which 
takes into account that the answer difficulty might dif-
fer across questions, reveals that these three variables 
can be combined into a cumulative scale. The H-
coefficient of this scale is 0.42, which according to 
Mokken indicates that the items form a moderately 
strong scale.  
We measure campaign-specific information (H1c, 
H2c, H3c) by an additive scale of correct answers to 
three questions concerning the party family of the 
three Spitzenkandidaten under study. In the third wave 
respondents were asked the following: ‘Several Euro-
pean political parties, in which Dutch political parties 
cooperate with other parties in Europe, have nominat-
ed a candidate for the presidency of the European 
Commission, should they become the largest political 
group in the European Parliament after the elections. 
Please indicate for each of the following politicians by 
which party they were nominated for presidency of the 
European Commission.’ The answering options com-
prised six major European party groups and the respec-
tive affiliated Dutch parties, in addition to a ‘don’t 
know’ and a ‘none of the above’ answer category. As 
before, correct answers were added up to form a scale 
that ranges from 0 to 3 (M=0.28, SD=0.71). The 
Mokken scale analysis returns an H-coefficient of 0.67, 
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indicating that the items form a very strong unidimen-
sional scale.  
The two variables campaign-specific information 
and general EU information are moderately correlated 
(r=0.37, p<.001). Furthermore, bivariate correlations 
between the news exposure variables and the infor-
mation variables are at best weak (Table A3). Correla-
tions range from r=0.13 (public TV news exposure and 
general EU information) to r=0.29 (broadsheet expo-
sure and campaign information); non-quality news ex-
posure (including public TV and tabloids) does not have 
a significant relationship with the information varia-
bles. Since the correlations between the independent 
variables are not very strong and since we have differ-
ent expectations regarding the moderating effects of 
the different knowledge scales, we decided that the 
scales should not be combined in a single measure of 
knowledge and/or news exposure, but that we should 
analyse their effects separately.  
We also add the control variable national political 
information which comprises two questions about na-
tional politics in the third wave: one asked about the 
name of the current Minister of Foreign Affairs; the 
other one asked about the statutory length of the legis-
lative term of the Dutch lower house. It was calculated 
in a similar way as the other information variables. The 
final variable ranges from 0 to 2 (M=1.56, SD=0.65). 
The H-coefficient= 0.58 means that the items form a 
strong additive scale. Its correlations with the cam-
paign-specific information variable is 0.21 (p<.001); its 
correlation with the general EU information variable is 
0.24 (p<.001). The remaining control variables com-
prise age, gender (dummy female), and education 
(dummy variables higher and lower education, refer-
ence category: medium-level education) which were 
asked in the first wave. 
To answer our second and third research questions, 
we also use general EU information as well campaign 
information as operationalised above. National party 
preferences (needed for testing H2a, H2b, and H2c) 
were measured by asking respondents to indicate on a 
10-point scale ‘how likely is it that you will ever vote 
for this party’. In the stacked data matrix these scores 
were matched to the preferences for each Spitzenkan-
didat of the related party group: preferences for the 
Dutch Christian Democrats (CDA) which are part of the 
EPP (M=3.27, SD=2.73) were matched with preferences 
for Junker, the Labour party (PvdA) which belong to the 
S&D (M=3.27, SD=2.70) was matched to Schulz, and 
two liberal parties, VVD (M=3.54, SD=2.94) and D66 
(M=4.25, SD=2.99), which both form part of the ALDE 
group were linked to Verhofstadt.6 
Finally, we measure ideological distance on the left-
                                                          
6 Nb.: We took the means of the preferences for the VVD and 
D66, respectively, in order to match them to the preferences 
regarding Verhofstadt.  
right scale (Left-right distance) by the absolute distance 
of respondents’ self-placement and the respective par-
ty placements from the first wave. It ranges from 0 to 
10 (M=2.94, SD=2.37). Left-right distances to these na-
tional parties were also linked to preferences for 
Spitzenkandidaten in the way we just described. 
To account for other potential effects, we added 
several controls to the main models, which are shown 
in the Appendix (Tables A1 and Table A4). Here we 
control for EU attitudes, as strong individual prefer-
ences for EU integration might matter for the extent to 
which respondents are willing to provide a preference 
for each Spitzenkandidat; and might also impact their 
actual preferences. Since EU attitudes are multidimen-
sional (Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas, & De Vreese, 
2011), we use five factors which are averaged from a 
total of 18 survey questions from the third wave. These 
range from 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 7 (‘strongly 
agree’). The five factors, identified by confirmatory fac-
tor analysis, correspond to those identified by Boom-
gaarden et al. (2011) and De Vreese, Azrout, and Möl-
ler (2016): Negative affection (M=3.01, SD=1.55, 
Cronbach’s α=0.905), Utilitarianism and Idealism 
(M=3.76, SD=1.29, α=0.856), Performance (M=3.06, 
SD=1.19, α=0.870), Identity (M=2.73, SD=1.35, α=0.863), 
and Strengthening (M=2.81, SD=1.26, α=0.723). A simi-
lar rationale underpins the consideration of Govern-
ment satisfaction as an additional control. It is meas-
ured by the question ‘The current national government 
is doing a good job’ in the third wave with answer cat-
egories ranging from 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 7 
(‘strongly agree’). Lastly, in the logistic regression 
models (Table A1), we also control for left-right self-
placement of the respondent as well as national party 
preferences. The descriptive statistics can be found in 
the appendix. 
5. Findings 
We begin our analysis by answering our first research 
question. Table 1 provides the logistic regression mod-
els for each of the Spitzenkandidaten Juncker, Schulz, 
and Verhofstadt, respectively. We report the b coeffi-
cients and robust standard errors of our main effects 
on the dependent variable, which assesses whether cit-
izens formulate an opinion towards each of the 
Spitzenkandidaten. 
Our first set of hypotheses stipulates that infor-
mation and news exposure can explain why some citi-
zens express a preference for the Spitzenkandidaten. 
We expected that news exposure (H1a) would have a 
positive effect on citizens’ propensity to express a 
preference for candidates. Indeed, the models show 
that exposure to public television and tabloids is signif-
icant for all three candidates, while broadsheet expo-
sure only matters for the preference formation towards 
Schulz and Verhofstadt; the effect of private television 
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Table 1. Logistic regression, predicting the likelihood to express a preference for each Spitzenkandidat.  
 
Juncker Schulz Verhofstadt 
 b SE b SE b SE 
General EU information 0.336*** 0.078 0.321*** 0.077 0.314*** 0.080 
Campaign information 1.005*** 0.144 0.930*** 0.137 1.103*** 0.175 
Public TV news exposure  0.103*** 0.026 0.090*** 0.026 0.087*** 0.026 
Private TV news exposure  0.015 0.025 0.018 0.025 -0.015 0.026 
Broadsheet exposure  0.045 0.028 0.057** 0.027 0.085*** 0.029 
Tabloid exposure  0.037** 0.015 0.034** 0.015 0.038** 0.016 
Nat. political information 0.248** 0.104 0.261** 0.103 0.358*** 0.105 
Age 0.008** 0.004 0.009** 0.004 0.015*** 0.004 
Lower education 0.234 0.166 0.192 0.165 0.131 0.166 
Higher education 0.309** 0.140 0.158 0.140 0.393*** 0.140 
Female -0.444*** 0.119 -0.442*** 0.118 -0.440*** 0.119 
Country cue 0.318*** 0.120 0.368*** 0.119 0.334*** 0.120 
Constant -2.320*** 0.258 -2.271*** 0.255 -2.597*** 0.264 
-2 pseudo log likelihood 1703.254  1726.720  1688.578  
Wald chi2 193.953  188.004  194.669  
Prob > chi2 0.000  0.000  0.000  
BIC 1798.643  1822.109  1783.966  
N 1537  1537  1537  
Pseudo R Squared 0.170  0.159  0.193  
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; dependent variable: don’t know (0) vs. expressing voting preference for Spitzenkan-
didat (1), robust standard errors. 
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Campaign information
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Private TV news exposure
Broadsheet exposure
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Figure 1. Average marginal effects on the likelihood to express a preference for each Spitzenkandidat. Note: calcula-
tions are based on Table 1. 
is not significant. Furthermore, political information 
(H1b and H1c) is a strong predictor of citizens’ ability to 
reveal a preference for each of the Spitzenkandidaten. 
Table 1 shows that general information about the EU 
as well as campaign-specific information have signifi-
cant, positive effects for all candidates. 
In order to compare these effects across the 
Spitzenkandidaten we calculated the average marginal 
effects for all coefficients (see Mood, 2010). These are 
displayed in Figure 1. The effects of news exposure are 
comparatively small; exposure to public television 
news has the largest effect, while exposure to private 
television outlets has no effect for either candidate. 
These findings therefore only provide partial support 
for our first hypothesis H1a. Furthermore, Figure 1 
demonstrates that the average marginal effect of cam-
paign-specific information is strongest for all candi-
dates, followed by the average marginal effect of gen-
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eral EU political information (and national political in-
formation). Our results therefore lend support to hy-
potheses H1b and H1c. They underline our argument 
that citizens are better able to formulate an opinion 
about the Spitzenkandidaten if they have general infor-
mation about EU politics as well as campaign-specific in-
formation of the Spitzenkandidaten, given the complexi-
ty of the institutional relations in the EU and the abstract 
relationship between national parties and the nomina-
tions of the European party groups. The large effects of 
campaign-specific information underline that preference 
formation during European election campaigns is highly 
conditional upon the information available to citizens 
and voters. However, information about national politics 
also matters. Our control variable shows that it has a 
significant, positive effect for all candidates. 
The effects of our control variables, higher educa-
tion and age, have positive effects, although these are 
not consistent for all candidates. The effect of gender is 
significant and negative implying that men are more like-
ly to indicate a preference for each of the Spitzenkandi-
daten compared to women. Furthermore, we find that, 
for all candidates, respondents who received a country 
cue opted less often for the ‘don’t know’ response than 
respondents in the first group of our study.  
Our next analysis seeks to answer our second and 
third research questions concerning the factors re-
sponsible for variation in the distribution of voter pref-
erences for the Spitzenkandidaten, and the moderating 
role of political awareness in particular. Table 2 shows 
the results of the fixed effects regression explaining 
variation in voter preferences for all candidates. We 
are interested in the within respondent variance, not in 
explaining the variance between respondents. The de-
composition of the variance showed that 25% of the 
total variance is within respondents and 75% is be-
tween. The explained variance at the within level is ra-
ther low, meaning that relevant cues, like ideology and 
party affiliation do not explain much of the differences 
in preferences. 
We are interested in whether citizens base their 
preferences for the Spitzenkandidaten on their party 
preferences (H2a) or on their ideological proximity to 
the candidate’s party on the left-right dimension (H3a). 
The results lend support to our assumptions. Model 1 
shows that a one unit increase in the preference for 
the respective national party generates an increase of 
0.15 in the preferences for the Spitzenkandidat who is 
supported by that party, controlling for everything else. 
In line with our expectations, left-right distance gener-
ates a negative effect on the dependent variable: the 
further away an individual voter is from the respective 
party stances, the lower the support for the 
Spitzenkandidat of that party (b=-0.06, Model 4). Taken 
together, both results suggest that citizens indeed use 
cues in their evaluations of the Spitzenkandidaten. 
We expected further that information becomes imper-
ative for citizens to align their preferences for the 
Spitzenkandidaten with their party preferences and 
ideological orientations. The results reported in Model 
2 and 3 show that the relevance of party preferences 
as a cue for the preference formation for the candi-
dates increases with higher levels of general political 
information about the EU (b=0.06) as well as campaign-
specific information (b=0.17), lending support to hy-
potheses H2b and H2c, respectively. 
Table 2. Fixed-effects regression, explaining variation in preferences for the Spitzenkandidaten. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
PTV national party EU14 0.152*** 0.097*** 0.010    
 (0.025) (0.030) (0.024)    
General EU information* 
PTV national party EU14 
 0.063**     
 (0.026)     
Campaign information* 
PTV national party EU14 
  0.173***    
  (0.023)    
Left-right distance    -0.055** -0.016 0.050** 
    (0.025) (0.029 (0.025) 
General EU information* 
Left-right distance 
    -0.047*  
    (0.027)  
Campaign information* 
Left-right distance  
     -0.152*** 
     (0.027) 
Constant 3.370*** 3.373*** 3.489*** 4.279*** 4.277*** 4.253*** 
 (0.095) (0.094) (0.081) (0.073) (0.072) (0.067) 
N 1822 1822 1822 1600 1600 1600 
N groups 666 666 666 586 586 586 
R Squared within 0.052 0.060 0.126 0.005 0.009 0.044 
R Squared between 0.103 0.097 0.028 0.020 0.001 0.002 
R Squared overall 0.089 0.098 0.060 0.015 0.000 0.000 
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; dependent variable: voting preference for a Spitzenkandidat (1-10), robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
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Figure 2 visualises these effects and highlights the cru-
cial importance of information: for those who have no 
such information at hand, party preferences do not 
matter for the preference formation for the 
Spitzenkandidaten. It is important to realise that this is 
by far the largest group: two-thirds (67.9 per cent) of 
those respondents who evaluated the candidates (43.3 
per cent) did not know the party affiliation of any can-
didate. However, those who are better informed posi-
tively align their party preferences with their prefer-
ences for the European lead candidates. In comparison, 
the interaction effects are even stronger for campaign-
specific information than for general EU information. 
Similarly, as Table 3 (b=-0.05; Model 5) and Figure 2 
demonstrate, the interaction effect between general 
EU information and left-right distance is statistically 
significant and thus in line with H3b, yet weaker than 
that of campaign-specific information. Again, cam-
paign-specific information plays a crucial role: the neg-
ative effect of the left-right distance is indeed moder-
ated by voter knowledge about the Spitzenkandiaten 
(b=-0.15, Model 6). The visualisation of this moderating 
effect in Figure 2 shows that, again, citizens with no 
campaign-specific information do not use their ideolog-
ical preferences as cues in providing their preferences 
for the Spitzenkandidaten. Instead, their use of this cue 
increases with higher levels of campaign-specific in-
formation. These results thus lend support to H3c. 
 
Figure 2. The effects of party preference and left-right distance on preference for a Spitzenkandidat at different levels 
of information. Note: lines represent expected values and shadowed areas 95% confidence intervals. The calculations 
are based on individual regression models testing the main effect on the dependent variable for different samples of 
general EU and campaign-specific information, respectively. 
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6. Conclusions 
This study set out to examine the preference formation 
of Dutch citizens for the Spitzenkandidaten during the 
2014 EP election campaign. Our aim was two-fold: first-
ly, we were interested in those factors that determine 
whether citizens formulate a preference for a certain 
Spitzenkandidat. Secondly, we sought to explain the 
variation in their distribution of preferences. Based on 
the literature on citizens’ preference formation, we put 
forward three main explanatory factors for answering 
the first question: news exposure as well as political in-
formation and campaign-specific information about the 
Spitzenkandidaten, which can be summoned under 
what Zaller (1992) calls political awareness. Further-
more, we argued that information also moderates the 
effects of national party affiliations or left-right orien-
tations, which citizens are expected to use as cues in 
their evaluations of the Spitzenkandidaten.  
Our results show that exposure to public television 
news programmes and—to some extent also—
broadsheet reading explains the likelihood of indicating 
a preference for the Spitzenkandidaten. These findings 
are in line with research that finds that exposure to 
quality news content or hard news has a positive effect 
on political participation (e.g., Aarts & Semetko, 2003; 
Schmitt-Beck & Mackenrodt, 2010). We also find a pos-
itive effect of tabloid exposure. Some literature would 
expect no or a negative effect of such news outlets 
(e.g., Aarts & Semetko, 2003; De Vreese & Tobiasen, 
2007), but De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006) also 
find that attention to tabloid newspapers has a positive 
effect on the intention of Dutch voters to participate in 
a hypothetical EU referendum (see also Banducci et al., 
2015). We are unable to assess whether this is due to 
specific content features of this news coverage, let alone 
establish whether they were visible at all in these news-
papers. This has to do with the timing of our study. The 
third wave concluded on April 28, 2014. On that day the 
first pan-European presidential debate took place in 
Maastricht, after which the visibility of the Spitzenkandi-
daten in national broadsheets increased considerably 
across Europe (Gattermann, 2015). 
Furthermore, both general information about the 
EU and campaign-specific information represent im-
portant pre-conditions for citizens to formulate a pref-
erence for each of the Spitzenkandidaten. This reso-
nates with research on voting behaviour and opinion 
formation in the EU context which underlines the im-
portance of knowledge about European affairs (e.g., 
Hobolt, 2007; De Vries et al., 2011) and specific infor-
mation either about party positions (Hobolt & 
Wittrock, 2011) or EU performances (Elenbaas et al., 
2012). We believe that in the context of the 2014 elec-
tions acquiring general political information is crucial 
because of the complexity of the investiture proce-
dure; and knowledge of the Spitzenkandidaten be-
comes imperative since citizens elect national parties 
at the polls and hence need to have information about 
which candidate these parties support. 
Our results also confirm earlier research showing 
how citizens can use cues to arrive at meaningful elec-
toral decisions (e.g., Hobolt, 2007; Lupia, 1994; Toka, 
2008; Van der Brug, 1999). Even though we did not 
strictly study electoral decisions, our study shows that 
citizens can form meaningful preferences for candi-
dates that are relatively unknown by relying upon rele-
vant party cues. However, most of the literature stud-
ies electoral contexts in which people with little 
knowledge can use cues to arrive at a reasoned choice. 
In the current context, we found that only the most 
knowledgeable are able to use these cues, while those 
citizens who have no or only little EU political and 
campaign-specific information hardly use any cues of 
party identification or ideological orientations in their 
evaluations of the Spitzenkandidaten.  
Given the importance of news exposure and infor-
mation, only few citizens actually expressed their pref-
erences for each Spitzenkandidat. Moreover, of the 
minority of respondents who evaluated the candidates, 
only one third knew the party affiliation of one or more 
of these candidates. Even if we put the bar very low—
being able to name the party affiliation of one candi-
date and evaluating at least one candidate—just 16.1% 
of the respondents fulfil this criterion for providing a 
meaningful assessment of the candidates. While this 
has rather negative implications for democratic partici-
pation of EU citizens in EU elections, we should be 
careful not to dismiss the Spitzenkandidaten campaigns 
right away. European elections are still second-order 
and as such it is no surprise that many citizens are not 
sufficiently informed to express their opinion. Druck-
man (2014, p. 478) argues that we should be persuad-
ed of ‘the need to be realistic about what to expect of 
citizens and avoid setting impossible bars such as “full in-
formation”’ (emphasis in the original). It was the first 
time that European election campaigns were influenced 
by the Spitzenkandidaten; and the consequences of their 
nomination were still unknown during the campaign. 
Our finding that campaign-specific information is of cru-
cial importance for citizens’ ability to formulate a politi-
cal preference in EU elections thus also represents a 
recommendation for the 2019 elections to foster the 
campaign environment at the European level.  
Our results, which show that those citizens who are 
politically aware are also able to align their preferences 
for each Spitzenkandidat with their national party pref-
erences as well as with their ideological orientation, 
underline our recommendation. To use the words of 
Hobolt and Tilley (2014) these citizens ‘get it right’. Our 
analysis was based on a hypothetical question but the 
findings nevertheless imply that informed citizens and 
those who are regularly exposed to news might actual-
ly be able to hold their EU representatives accountable, 
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provided they are given the opportunity to do so. Thus, 
depending on their intensity, the Spitzenkandidaten 
campaigns may be able to contribute to alleviating the 
EU’s alleged accountability deficit. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Logistic regression, predicting the likelihood to express a preference for each Spitzenkandidat (full model). 
 
Juncker Schulz Verhofstadt 
 b SE b SE b SE 
General EU information 0.333*** 0.083 0.324*** 0.081 0.311*** 0.085 
Campaign information 0.956*** 0.148 0.872*** 0.141 1.031*** 0.177 
Public TV news exposure  0.128*** 0.029 0.112*** 0.028 0.107*** 0.028 
Private TV news exposure  0.014 0.029 0.022 0.028 -0.011 0.029 
Broadsheet exposure  0.053* 0.028 0.063** 0.028 0.093*** 0.030 
Tabloid exposure  0.032* 0.018 0.027 0.018 0.032* 0.018 
Negative affection 0.080 0.053 0.096* 0.053 0.090* 0.054 
Performance 0.166** 0.082 0.132 0.083 0.068 0.081 
Identity  -0.012 0.068 0.001 0.069 -0.005 0.07 
Utilitarianism/idealism 0.005 0.083 0.013 0.082 0.062 0.081 
Strengthening -0.008 0.068 0.003 0.067 0.002 0.068 
PTV CDA EU14 0.002 0.026 0.001 0.026 0.001 0.026 
PTV PvdA EU14 0.018 0.030 0.013 0.029 0.006 0.030 
PTV VVD EU14 0.027 0.028 0.024 0.028 0.029 0.029 
PTV D66 EU14 -0.024 0.026 -0.021 0.026 -0.005 0.026 
Nat. political information 0.207* 0.125 0.204* 0.122 0.286** 0.124 
Left-right self-placement 0.027 0.036 0.011 0.035 0.013 0.036 
Government satisfaction  -0.124** 0.057 -0.099* 0.057 -0.075 0.056 
Age 0.007 0.005 0.008* 0.005 0.015*** 0.005 
Lower education 0.146 0.192 0.131 0.19 0.070 0.191 
Higher education 0.264* 0.154 0.116 0.155 0.342** 0.155 
Female -0.534*** 0.131 -0.523*** 0.13 -0.504*** 0.132 
Country cue 0.312** 0.132 0.381*** 0.131 0.378*** 0.132 
Constant -2.630*** 0.496 -2.584*** 0.492 -3.052*** 0.507 
-2 pseudo log likelihood 1405.184  1428.816  1392.45  
Wald chi2 166.628  159.652  162.136  
Prob > chi2 0.000  0.000  0.000  
BIC 1576.249  1599.881  1563.515  
N 1246  1246  1246  
Pseudo R Squared 0.173  0.160  0.191  
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; dependent variable: don’t know (0) vs. expressing voting preference for Spitzenkan-
didat (1), robust standard errors. 
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics for full sample of the third wave (corresponding to the analysis reported in Table 1 and 
Table A1, respectively). 
Variable N Min Max Mean SD 
DV Juncker 1537 0.00 1.00 0.3871 0.48725 
DV Schulz 1537 0.00 1.00 0.3878 0.48740 
DV Verhofstadt 1537 0.00 1.00 0.4203 0.49377 
General EU information 1537 0.00 3.00 0.5504 0.83866 
Campaign information 1537 0.00 3.00 0.2785 0.71024 
Public TV news exposure  1537 0.00 7.00 3.3071 2.68860 
Private TV news exposure  1537 0.00 7.00 2.1932 2.42432 
Broadsheet exposure  1537 0.00 18.00 0.9948 2.56351 
Tabloid exposure  1537 0.00 28.00 2.6701 3.96237 
Negative affection 1537 1.00 7.00 3.0073 1.55186 
Performance 1537 1.00 7.00 3.0568 1.19464 
Identity  1537 1.00 7.00 2.7274  1.35066  
Utilitarianism/idealism 1537 1.00 7.00 3.7642 1.28594 
Strengthening 1537 1.00 7.00 2.8124 1.25601 
PTV CDA EU14 1447 1 10 3.27 2.726 
PTV PvdA EU14 1441 1 10 3.27 2.701 
PTV VVD EU14 1441 1 10 3.54 2.938 
PTV D66 EU14 1441 1 10 4.25 2.993 
Nat. political information 1537 0.00 2.00 1.5615 0.65274 
Left-right self-placement 1306 0 10 5.24 2.298 
Government satisfaction  1537 1 7 3.22 1.457 
Age 1537 18 92 48.95 17.168 
Lower education 1537 0.00 1.00 0.1698 0.37559 
Higher education 1537 0.00 1.00 0.3208 0.46692 
Female 1537 0.00 1.00 0.5075 0.50011 
Country cue 1537 0.00 1.00 0.4867 0.49998 
Table A3. Bivariate Correlations between the main independent variables. 
 
General EU 
information 
Campaign 
information 
Public TV news 
exposure 
Private TV news 
exposure 
Broadsheet 
exposure 
Tabloid 
exposure 
General EU information 1      
Campaign information 0.372*** 1     
Public TV news exposure 0.128*** 0.199*** 1    
Private TV news exposure -0.007 -0.037 0.131*** 1   
Broadsheet exposure 0.151*** 0.292*** 0.206*** -0.064** 1  
Tabloid exposure 0.030 0.015 0.164*** 0.198*** 0.111*** 1 
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
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Table A4. Random-effects regression, explaining variation in preferences for the Spitzenkandidaten. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE 
General EU information 0.242*** 0.090 0.053 0.132 0.252*** 0.091 0.224** 0.094 0.335*** 0.109 0.207** 0.094 
Campaign information -0.075 0.090 -0.074 0.090 -0.657*** 0.132 -0.056 0.092 -0.059 0.092 0.341*** 0.111 
Public TV news exposure 0.101*** 0.035 0.102*** 0.035 0.095*** 0.035 0.102*** 0.038 0.099*** 0.038 0.099*** 0.038 
Private TV news exposure 0.011 0.034 0.014 0.034 0.009 0.034 0.01 0.036 0.011 0.036 0.011 0.036 
Broadsheet exposure 0.013 0.023 0.014 0.023 0.010 0.023 0.003 0.023 0.001 0.023 0.001 0.023 
Tabloid exposure 0.032 0.020 0.030 0.02 0.034* 0.020 0.028 0.021 0.029 0.021 0.030 0.021 
PTV national party EU14 0.160*** 0.023 0.118*** 0.027 0.047** 0.022       
General EU information* PTV 
national party EU14 
  
0.049** 0.023   
      
Campaign information* PTV 
national party EU14 
  
  0.147*** 0.022 
      
Left-right distance       -0.060*** 0.023 -0.028 0.027 0.031 0.024 
General EU information* Left-
right distance 
        
-0.040 0.025   
Campaign information* Left-
right distance 
        
  -0.136*** 0.025 
Negative affection 0.031 0.060 0.034 0.060 0.041 0.061 0.072 0.070 0.073 0.070 0.077 0.070 
Performance 0.163 0.101 0.170* 0.100 0.182* 0.102 0.197* 0.108 0.201* 0.109 0.227** 0.109 
Identity 0.289*** 0.081 0.290*** 0.081 0.281*** 0.081 0.270*** 0.091 0.270*** 0.091 0.271*** 0.091 
Utilitarianism/ 
idealism 
0.137 0.095 0.133 0.095 0.145 0.096 0.228** 0.105 0.228** 0.106 0.214** 0.106 
Strengthening 0.018 0.078 0.017 0.078 0.021 0.078 0.023 0.085 0.026 0.085 0.028 0.084 
Nat. political information 0.109 0.160 0.122 0.161 0.136 0.164 -0.146 0.204 -0.145 0.204 -0.127 0.204 
Government satisfaction 0.08 0.067 0.082 0.067 0.092 0.068 0.11 0.072 0.110 0.072 0.113 0.072 
Age 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.072 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.006 
Lower education -0.068 0.233 -0.09 0.234 -0.100 0.234 -0.086 0.259 -0.102 0.260 -0.127 0.260 
Higher education 0.373** 0.181 0.361** 0.183 0.423** 0.184 0.448** 0.197 0.448** 0.197 0.437** 0.197 
Female 0.100 0.161 0.114 0.161 0.140 0.164 0.217 0.175 0.221 0.176 0.228 0.176 
Country cue 0.266* 0.156 0.276* 0.157 0.283* 0.158 0.263 0.170 0.265 0.170 0.260 0.171 
Constant -0.460 0.576 -0.369 0.583 -0.283 0.588 0.271 0.730 0.156 0.730 -0.065 0.726 
N 1822  1822  1822  1600  1600  1600  
N groups 666  666  666  586  586  586  
R Squared within 0.052  0.060  0.124  0.005  0.008  0.044  
R Squared between 0.255  0.252  0.239  0.215  0.214  0.211  
R Squared overall 0.214  0.214  0.220  0.164  0.165  0.171  
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; dependent variable: voting preference for a Spitzenkandidat (1-10), robust standard error. 
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Table A5. Descriptive statistics corresponding to the analysis reported in Tables 2 and A4. 
Variable N Min Max Mean SD 
PTV for Spitzenkandidat (DV) 1837 1.00 10.00 3.9358 2.61848 
General EU information 1837 0.00 3.00 0.8029 0.96244 
Campaign information 1837 0.00 3.00 0.5890 0.95734 
Public TV news exposure  1837 0.00 7.00 4.1306 2.65096 
Private TV news exposure  1837 0.00 7.00 2.2444 2.49763 
Broadsheet exposure  1837 0.00 18.00 1.6298 3.23720 
Tabloid exposure  1837 0.00 21.00 3.1840 4.11476 
Negative affection 1837 1.00 7.00 2.9477 1.64205 
Performance 1837 1.00 7.00 3.0912 1.23614 
Identity  1837 1.00 7.00 2.8173 1.46452 
Utilitarianism/idealism 1837 1.00 7.00 3.9469 1.39354 
Strengthening 1837 1.00 7.00 2.8848 1.39242 
PTV national party EU14 1800 1.00 10.00 3.64 2.688 
Nat. political information 1837 0.00 2.00 1.7349 0.54428 
Left-right distance 1600 0.00 10.00 2.9384 2.37030 
Government satisfaction  1837 1.00 7.00 3.26 1.533 
Age 1837 18 87 53.60 16.722 
Lower education 1837 0.00 1.00 0.1590 0.36573 
Higher education 1837 0.00 1.00 0.3941 0.48879 
Female 1837 0.00 1.00 0.4241 0.49433 
Country cue 1837 0.00 1.00 0.5161 0.49988 
 
 
